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moral theology at St . Joseph's Seminary , Dun woodie, Yonkers, New
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The designation "Judeo-Christian teaching" in the title is chosen
deliberately. While the bulk of official and scholarly documentation in this
statement will be explicitly Catholic, I would like to make the initial point
that the core teaching - and its continuity- here presented , is not
narrowly singular, much less peculiar, to the Catholic tradition. What is
here presented is, I submit, in accord with the broad spectrum of
Protestant Christianityl and also in accord with Orthodox Judaism . 2
Further, the basic definitions and distinctions here presented, are in
basic accord with the stated ethics and policy statements of the "Judicial
Council" of the American Medical Association as approved by its House
of Delegates (in Anaheim, CA, Dec. 4, 1973)3 and as revised and published
as "# 2. 11 Terminal IlIiness" In the Current Opinions of the Judicial
Council of the AMA. (1981) .4
I

,

The first definition is also a distinction that will and has proved useful,
not only in the context of death and dying, but to medical practice in
general.
This is the distinction between ORDINARY and EXTRAORDINARY
means. This distinction has a long history both in medicine and ethics: it is
over 400 years old. s And while there is almost complete agreement in the
application of these terms in medicine and in morals , there can be some
nuanced differences because the presuppositions of its moral use can be
wider than those of its medical use .
In medicine, some narrow the acceptance of these terms in relation to
science only. Thus, "ordinary means" connote means which are regarded
as "customary", "standard", "orthodox", and "tested", procedures in
relation to medical science as it now is . "Extraordinary means" would connote the "unusual", "heroic", "orthodox", "unproved" or "experimental"
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procedures which are incompletely established or simply unestablished ,
again in relation to medical science as it now is. Thus, many of today's
"ordinary means" were yesterday's "extraordinary means" not because
morals are changing, but because science is progressing.
Morally, ORDINARY and EXTRAORDINARY means are calculated
ethically - not in relation only to science as such-but in relation to the
patient's actual conditions and factual circumstances, some of which
would not be strictly medical or scientific.
Thus, in concise form, the cluster of relevant criteria can be stated: all
medicines , procedures, treatments and operations which: (I) offer a
reasonable hope of benefit to this patient , (2) without serious danger of
death , and (3) without excessive burden , pain, hardship, even subjective
repugnance.
Defining 'Ordinary' and 'Extraordinary'
If a particular procedure , treatment or operation does offer an
individual patient a reasonable hope of benefit without serious danger or
excessive burdens , then that treatment is for that patient an ORDINARY
means in his / her circumstances.
If, on the other hand, a particular treatment offers a particular patient
no reasonable hope of benefit , or does involve serious danger of death, or
only a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, then that is an
EXTRAORDINARY means for that patient in his / her circumstances.
Traditionally, all are considered bound to use "ordinary means" to
preserve their life, health and bodily integrity. (Failure to do so would
ethically be suicidal.) Usually, one is not bound to use "extraordinary
means" for same, but is free to do so if one so chooses. In short, "ordinary
means" an; considered obligator.!'; "extraordinary" are optional.
This, of course, is a statement of general principle(s) which requires
refinement and concrete exemplification to clarify its extension and
comprehension. While the terms are widely received in porxular discourse ,
their timeless repetition is not always accompanied by timely
understanding.
While the ordinary / extraordinary distinction is very old, much of its
present precision is attributed to the formal and extensive teaching of the
late Pope Pius XI L in particular his add ress. covering this subject. of Nov .
24, 1957 6 The same principles are presently encapsulated in two sentences
in Directive #28 of The Ethical and Religious . Directil'es.f(JI" Catholic
Health Facilities of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. which
reads:
Euthanasia ("mercy killing") in a ll its form s is fo rbidd en. The failure to suppl\' th e
ordinary mea ns of preserving life is C4ui\'alent to eu thana sia. Howe\·cr. neither
the ph ysician nor the pati e nt is obliged to use extraordinary means.-

Further. in a recent and formal doctrinal instruction. the Vat ican
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith issued a "Declaration on
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Euthanasia" on May 5, 1980, which confirms and clarifies the same
teaching. 8
While some of the above statements have the advantage of being
concise, and , therefore, apparently clear, their rationale and ref\nement
deserve some close attention if they are to serve as more thaj1 mere
rhetorical points of reference.
I-a) Rationale. The rationale and basis for the ordinary / extraordinary
distinction in Catholic teaching is meant to reflect the difference between a
negative prohibition which is tightly circumscribed, and , a positive
admonition which can't be circumscribed in general , but only in concrete
particulars.
The received teaching understands the 5th Commandment, ("Thou
shalt not kill! Ex. 20: I 3; Mil. 19: 18) in both positive and negative terms. 9
The negative prohibition~in exceptionless form ~proscribes and means
never directly take the life of an innocent or helpless person. Positively, the
same commandment proscribes an obligation to take care of our life,
health and bodily integrity, which positive duty is to be fulfilled
affirmatively within reasonable and proportionate limits. For this reason ,
"ordinary" means are said to be obligatory, and "extraordinary" means are
optional.
I-b) Within the notion of ORDINARY means, it is now necessary to
make some mention of MINIMAL means. "Minimal means" are always
presumed to be " ordinary" while allowing that their mechanical delivery ,
in unusual circumstances might, by exception , qualify as "extraordinary"
means .
"Minimal" means could be defined as basic hygiene and supportive
measures , namely food , water, bed rest, room temperature and personal
hygiene. We owe these measures of support to other human beings simply
because they are human beings. In pediatric cases , where the patient
cannot, by definition, be self-supporting, one can consider normal feeding,
blood , oxygen , clearing air passages, supplying warmtp as "minimal" and
mandatory means. Neglect of these would , in fact, be destructive.
I-c) Some have recently and mistakenly converted this ordinary / extraordinary distinction into a proportionate / disproportionate calculus.
Indeed , no less than a Presidential Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research proposes
this substitution. 10 Now, while it is certainly the right and privilege of a
Presidential Commission to make recommendations about which
distinctions are or are not any longer useful in the "formulation 'Of public
policy,"11 I find it somewhat droll that the same federal commission would
take it upon itself to reformulate Vatican teaching on behalf of the
Vatican. 12 (I suspect that that Commission's ethical over-reach was due
not to lack of interest, but to its own over-reliance on one of its
acknowledged consultants -=J~ J. Paris, S.J .~ whose somewhat confused
grasp of received Catholic teaching may well have confused the
Commission.) 13
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I-d) Rather than re-interpret what the 1980 "Decla ration On Euthanasia"
allegedly "subst itutes", it would be better to see what it actually does say
and propose as clarification (rather than substitution) in the ordinary / extraordinary distinction:
It will be possible to make a correct judgment as to the means hy studying the l iP"
of lrealmel1f used. it s degree of comp/exilr or risk. its C(lSI and the IJOssihi/ili"s of
using it. and comparing th ese e lemen ts with the result that ca n he expected.
tak i ng into accoun t the s{{lle of t he sick IJl'rSOIl and h is o r her ,,"rsica/ a nd II/(J/"{//
reso urces."
(Emphasis added)

This stateme nt , with ot hers. of clar ifying cons id erat ions is immediately
followed by four kinds of general cases which underline the non-obligatory
(thUS ethically optional) nature of extraordinary means.
- Where other remedies do not suffice. it is permissible. with the patient's
consent, to employ the most advanced techniques . even those which are
experimental and not without certain risk.
- Likewise it is permissible to interrupt these same means where results
fall short of expectations in accord with the reasonable wishes of the
patient , the patient's family and the advice of physician s especially
competent in the matter.
- It is also permissible to make do with the normal means medicine can
offer for "one cannot impose on anyone the obligation to have recourse to
an available technique which involves a real danger or is burdensome ."
Such a refusal is not the equivalent of suicide but should be considered an
acceptance of the human condition.
- Lastly, when death is imminent. one can refuse forms of treatment
which would secure only a precarious and burdensome prolongation of
life, so long as the normal care due to the sick person. in simil ar cases. is not
interrupted. 15
I n all of the above. the designation ordinary / extraordinary is predicated
of the means. NOT of the Ii/e of the patient. Clearly. if a patient's life can be
described as "extraordinary". then any and all means .-!even the most
minimal means - could be described as extraordinary to that patient . .
which effective ly finesses the question and the careful judgment of the
factual circumstances of the individual case.

Easy to Slide into Judgments
It is all too easy today to slide or to jump into facile. even popular.
"quality of life" judgments while pretending not to pass or make a
judgment at all. Again. the proper judgment focuses on the extraordinari ness of the means. not on some allegedly extraordinary Ii/e.
Of course. such factors as expectation of success or degree of comfort in
surviva l do pertain to and focus on qualities of the patient's life. However.
a now widespread a nd. in some places. a legal term such as "recovery to
cognitive and sapient life" is a different kind of"qua lit y-of- li fe"judgment.
It serves now as a code word and deserves to be unpacked.
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"Recovery" is an unspecified promise word! Recovery to what degree?
To what extent? What of those persons for whom there is no recovery?
Some are born with physical or mental disabilities from which there is no
recovery.
"Cognitive and sapient life." These terms have been bouncing around
the euthanasia movement for the past 80 years . Both are accordion
words- either can mean as much or as little as one chooses to assign to it.
One may judge from what I say here that I am not all that "cognitive",
which might make me wonder whether this audience is all that "sapient."
These are not accurate diagnostic ratings of pathologies but only scientificsounding value judgments some people make about other people.
The same slippery and careless kind of value judgment is buried in
another popular slogan - "meaningful life"! Meaningful to whom? To
you? To me? To the editorial board of a favorite newspaper? Whoever
makes this kind of quality-of-life kind 0'£ judgment will not be on the
receiving end of such a judgment and , whatever degrees of "meaningfulness" are assigned to another person's life , we should not forget that that
life is the only life that person has.
I-e) A patient may live a long time with a so-called "hopeless disease",
so , a particular means may be useless in curing a disease, but useful in
prolonging or supporting life. The fact that it will not cure the disease does
not change the positive duty we have to use means which support or
preserve life. If a means will prolong life and is not too burdensome , that is,
I think, an ordinary means. One cannot simply argue that the disease is
incurable and , by that fact alone, no obligation exists to preserve or
support life. The presumption underl ying the opposite conclusion does
rest on a porous quality-of-life decision , i.e., if one's life does not or will not
meet a certain standard , it is not considered worth living or preserving or
supporting.
I-f) The 1980 "Declaration On Euthanasia" and prior statements as well,
outline principles which refer to burden and benefit , or use . If a treatment
is not burdensome and would be beneficial, it is constdered "ordinary",
and a duty to use it. In conventional ethics, preserving or supporting life is
considered a benefit. Burden here, of course, refers to a burden suffered or
carried by the patient, not whether this ordinary support is a burden on the
community, or a burden on third-party payers, or a burden to visit such a
patient on alternate Wednesdays.
I-g) Traditionally, the ordinary / extraordinary distinction is not limited
to terminal cases. It can bear on cases of radical amputation or
hemodialysis which can prolong life indefinitely. In these cases, the
decisive focus may not be whether it benefits the patient-for clearly it
does-but whether or how excessive a burden an individual patient can
carry.
Father John Connery, S.J ., is , I think, correct in preferring to keep
separate the benefit / burden analysis in that they can be different issues
often applying to different cases. The question of benefit looms larger in
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terminal cases, burden looms larger in non-terminal cases, and while there
can be reasons to separate them it is not objectionable to combine them. 16
Also, there can as well be significant differences in terminal and nonterminal cases. Often when death is imminent (in moral terms "imminent"
is measured in hours and days. not in captions of six months or one year to
live). in a terminal case. nothing reasonable can be done whatever we
choose. whereas. at life'~ beginnings, many reasonable things can be done
but some choose not to do them.
In summary here. there is no pre-coded checklist or printout which can
determine antecedently what is or is not an ordinary or extraordinary
means as such. apart from the minimal and most highly experimental
means . The correct determination of the extraordinariness of extraordinary means can only be made on a case by case basis in view of the factual
and actual circumstances of that case. 17
From this section. it will appear that I am not particularly sanguine
about what the general statutes of civil law can establish or resolve. given
the nature of the ordinary / extraordinary distinction. From what follows.
it should also appear that I do not believe most recent and current
legislative proposals are after that but are. perhaps. after something else .
II
A Clear and Present Danger
Apart from the public policy question of whether or not the
ordinary / extraordinary distinction is helpful or even useful. new
terminology has begun to permeate public discussion, legislative
proposals; legal decisions and the death-and-dying literature. The last is
definitely a growth industry.
It is common. now. to speak in terms of ACTIVE (positive) and
PASSIVE (negative) euthanasia as ideas whose time has come. I submit
that the time has come to examine these terms closely. I have a little
personal rule (which is why I call it "Smith's Rule") that "All Social
Engineering Is Preceded by Verbal Engineering!"
,
When a distinction such as the ordinary / extraordinary is well grounded
in Western medicine. all Western religions and is. at least. compatible with
our Anglo-American civil law tradition. I become at least curious about
proposed changes of words. lest something else is really changing while
appearing to be only a change in words. "All Social Engineering Is
Preceded By Verbal Engineering."
And so . the proposal - active and passive euthanasia . The term "active"
connotes "commission". doing something. e.g .. delivering the deadly dose.
a positive act which actively causes death. Most. but surely not aiL in our
society are at present opposed to this. We might note. however. that the
Exil society in England and the Hem/ock society in the U.S.A. are not
opposed to active euthanasia. Indeed. their publications IX advocate
euthanasia as a "right" and Derek Humphry's book. LeI Me Die BeFore I
Wake serves as a how-to manual by listing at the conslusion of several
32

Linacre Quarterl y

chapters how much of which drugs of what toxicity are needed to cause
death in the most efficient fashion. 19 (Given the national rise in teenage
suicide , this particular book does not deserve wide circulation.) This
literature is euphemistically described as "self-deliverance" literature
without benefit of mentioning just to what or to whom one's self will be
delivered.
However, the present danger and greatest current confusion concerns
so-called PASSIVE (negative) euthanasia which appears in most
legislative proposals and, increasingly, in some court decisions.
At first , "passive" euthanasia seems to reflect the conventional
ordinary / extraordinary distinction just mentioned , but it does not do so
properly or completely.
The term "passive" connotes "omission" (a withholding, a withdrawal)
of some treatment or procedure. But the term "passive-omission" is
inherently ambiguous until and unless it is determined what kind of means
is being passively omitted, withheld or withdrawn.
On the one hand , the 'passive omission of an extraordinary means is
NOT euthanasia and should not be so called . 2o But, on the other hand , the
passive omission of an ordinary means is euthanasia and should be so
called. 21
A clarifying definition pertinent to this is found in the 1980 "Declaration
On Euthanasia" which reads:
By euthanasia is understood an action or an omission which of itself or by
intention causes death , in order that all suffering may in this way be eliminated.
Euthanasia's terms of reference, therefore. are to be found in the intention of the
will and in the methods used 22

Please, this not merely quibbling over words. All sorts of legislative
proposals and court decisions have proposed or decided a patient's alleged
"right" to refuse or forego ALL med ical means without clarifying whether
that refusal refuses extraordinary means (with which 1(0 one really argues
or absolutely forbids), or refuses all ordinary means - even minimal
means - (with which most, except for euthanatizers, really do disagree).
For example, the celebrated Claire Conroy case in New Jersey, decided
Jan. 17, 1985, declared no less than four times that a patient has the right
"to decline to have am' medical treatment" (p. 21); again , "to decline
medical treatment" (p. 22, quoting Quinlan); "to refuse medical treatment"
(p. 30); and finally "the right to decline any medical treatment, including
artificial feeding" (p. 62) . Over and over, the alleged "right" to decline or
refuse ANY treatment without clarifying or specifying "I'hat kind of
treatment is being declined or refused. 23
Another example is the sad and troubled Bouvia case in California
which established the "right" to refuse ANY and ALL treatment on our
Pacific coast. Having first won the legal right not to be fed , Ms . Bouvia
next secured a court order to determine her morphine leveJ.24 Is this
medicine? Or, is the physician now the equivalent of a maItre d' who simply
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presents a medical menu and takes orders regardless of what the patient
(customer) orders or refuses?
It is this unqualified canonization of the passive omission of ANY and
ALL treatment that presents a clear and present danger to our public
policy and to the ethics of the med ical profession. There is no way that this
trend can be confined to the death-and-dying context where death is
imminent; it has already been moved to and applied to the chronically
ill - those patients who are not getting any better nor getting any worse. (It
is already selectively applied in pediatric cases; e.g., Indiana's Baby Doe
case.)
If minimal means-food , water, bed rest, room temperature, personal
hygiene - can be passively omitted from this class of persons, that is no
mere neutral omission, but a lethal omission which causes death; it kills .
When a competent patient's ability to request same is compromised and
this decision is delegated to a surrogate, to substituted judgment, or to
committees of or for that person, the number of players may become
larger, but the outcome is no more secure ethically.
Already, on March 15, 1986, meeting in New Orleans , a seven person
committee of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American
Medical Association, reported out favorably this recommendation:
it is not unethical to discontinue all m ea ns of life-prolonging medica l
treatment ... for a patien t in irreversi ble coma when death is imminent: and even
if death is not imminent .. 25

It seems to me , that the small addition of the last clause, "even if death is
not imminent", represents a small step back for man but a giant step
backwards for mankind . I do not use the term "mankind" in a sexist sense,
but rather I use it to emphasize that such a step is not "kind" to man nor
woman, for it means we do not treat some as our kind anymore.
Allowing to die, by foregoing extraordinary means , is choos ing to live
even when dying. But the omission of ordinary-especially minimal means is no mere omission. but a lethal omission. The 198<J "Declaration
on Euthanasia" addresses this very point. that it is permitted:
to refuse forms of treatment that wou ld onl y secu re a precarious an d
burdensome pro lo ngation of life. so long as the norma/ care due to the sick perso n
in similar cases is /lOI il7lerruflled."
(Emphasis added)

Pope John Paul II ha s tirelessly repeated this last qualification - on Oct.
2 L 1985. addressing two working groups of the Pontifical Academy of
SciencesY and again. on Nov . 15. 1985. to a Conference on "PreLeukaem ia" with an important reason stated:
The principle ... while it discourages from employment of purel y expe rim en tal or
co mplet e ly ineffectual ope ration s. does not dispense from the valid therape utic
task of sustaining life nor from the administration of the /lonl/a/mean" of \'ila/
S li/'/}() r/ , Science. e,'en when it is unabl e to heal. can and sho uld care for and assist
t he sic k, "
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Thus, we might offer as a principle: Even when there is no cure, there
remains the obligation of human care- that care and assistance which
include normal means of vital support.
To expand the "when-death-is-not-imminent" net can, in our society, be
a very extensive net indeed, not only to the irreversibly comatose , but also
to what one journal calls those "biologically tenacious individ uals"; then to
the chronically sick whose "cognitive" functions are lowered, lessened or
hardly recordable. Some persons experience such things post trauma;
others are born that way. If the most ordinary, even minimal , means of
medical maintenance or support are passively omitted , passively
withdrawn, or passively withheld from these persons, we have, I submit,
not just a new development of words , but a new and transformed medical
ethic.
III
Problem: Suggested Source and Suggested Cure

A legal litany of court cases is , by now, familiar: Quinlan (NJ);
Saikewicz (MA); Perlmutter (FL); Fox / Storar (NY); Severns (DE);
Brophy (MA); Herbert (CA); Barber (CA); Bouvia (CA) . Traffic is very
heavy in California, as are some heavy precedents.
Curiously, in this age of deregulation, California is the state with the
most laws and regulations about death and dying. California was the first
to pass a so-called "Natural Death Act" (1976); next, it added a "Durable
Power of Attorney" law, and now is considering a third law on "Advanced
Directives." Yet this state with the most laws, whose presenting reasons
were to "cliHify", is the state with the most court cases then and now.
Perhaps this only proves that no law is litigation-proof and no law is
interpretation-proof.
As suggested above , I do not think that positive statutes can resolve
antecedently complicated judgments re ordinary / extraordinary, but
poorly drafted statutes will certainly complicate matlfrs further. There is
an axiom in both logic and in law that a negative prohibition binds semper
et pro semper, i.e., it is always in effect and covers all cases , whereas a
positive law binds semper sed non pro semper, i.e., it too is always in effect
but can't touch all cases.
Thus, for example, a negative law forbidding auto theft is simple
enough; negatively, it forbids the taking (against the reasonable will of the
owner) of any and every car, old or new, stretch size or sub-compacts.
However a positive law- to pay just taxes- is always in place, but to spell
that out positively in all possible circumstances is no small effort. Witness
the recent overhaul of our federal tax code (what it applies to, what not).
No informed person could possibly suggest that they would or could sum
up that positive tax law in a sentence or two, a talk or two, an audit or two.
Accuracy there depends on a mountain of factual, actual circumstances,
along with a deep valley of possible exceptions.
So too, in the medical-moral decisions re ordinary / extraordinary
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means. We already have a law that says physicians cannot kill those they
cannot cure- part of the homicide statutes. But, on the other hand, there is
no law that says a patient or physician must use ALL means on ALL
patients at ALL times regardless of hardship, burden or grave
inconvenience . Such a law would not only be futile but stupid; one might
just as well pass a law against mortality. The fact is , people do die- and we
will, too- whether or nqt we have accumulated the requisite amount of
certified credits in a death and dying course.
The legislative dificulty is not, as I see it, in the extreme: do
EVERYTHING or do NOTHING. The difficulty is the vast in-between.
How can a positive statute possibly foresee antecedently all the actual
medical factors and relevant health circumstances and possible
complications of just the people in this audience? And it is the actual
assessment of factual and personal circumstances which is crucial to the
determination of the extraordinariness of extraordinary means in any
given factual case.
My legal friends tell me that "hard cases make bad law", and I suspect
that "really hard cases make really bad law". It is my personal opinion that
you can't legislate hard cases out of existence. My respect for ourjust civil
laws is profound and sincere. Indeed, as a form of regulating human
conduct in a way consistent with human dignity, just civil laws are light
years ahead of whatever is in second place .

Question of Trust
But one problem which is not discussed very much in the rush to litigate
and legislate is the question of trust. I suspect that you can't legislate trust,
either, just as I suspect and know that the core element in the physicianpatient relationship is the basis in trust and the virtue of trust. Medicine,
like any learned profession, rests on and needs a relationship of trust.
which is why that profession, and others, require a professional oath and
code of ethics.
My suggestion here is that this is the root problem: oJr society and
public policy are making and changing the professional oath and ethics of
the medical profession. The past decade (1976-1986) of legislative activity,
so-called Living Wills, Natural Death Acts, Durable Powers of Attorney,
Advance Directives. etc .. have all advanced under the banner of
unqualified patient autonomy to the extent that the zenith of unqualified
autonomy has been reached and one of the core components of traditional
medical ethics has been reversed. ~9
If the most recent Bouvia decision becomes the societal trend then the
new medical ethic turns on WHO is to CHOOSE rather than WHAT is
CH OS EN. Proced ural mechanisms are so designed to ensure "free choice"
that they offer no coherent guidance for judging the relative goodness of
that choice.
Unqualified autonomy mechanisms do not assist physicians to
discharge their deepest ethical responsibility- first do no harm (primum
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non nocere.f), nor their duty to formulate individualized treatment

recommendations based on a medically informed understanding of the
patient's good. 30
In the new ethic, patient choice (a utonomy) is more important than best
interest (beneficence). This is the complete triumph of procedural ethics
(mechanisms and modalities of consent) over substantive ethics (the oath
and promise first- to do no harm) . The newly committed physician is
reduced to a committed facilitator, committed to carrying out patient
preferences regardless of the outcome of that preferential choice. Unless
corrected, not si mply by stepping off the case , this is a danger not only to
physicians but to the medical community as an organized profession ,
committed by oath to a known ethic.
Consider the question of suicide. No jurisdiction in these United States
penalizes suicide as a crime. If one succeeds, the case is moot ; if one fails in
the attempt, we consider that a cry for help needing counseling, not
incarceration. Yet, in most jurisdictions, it is a crime to assist a suicide.
Consider next the concluding sections of most of the so-called LivingWill legislation . Almost all conclude with cautions and disclaimers: that
this new law has no civil nor criminal liability consequences re suicide; no
insurance consequences re suicide; no professional peer rebuke
consequences re suicide. In net result , such laws and similar court
decisions, especially those procla iming a "right" to refuse ANY and ALL
means, including the most minimal means , simply de-criminalize and
de-fang all the possible penalties or consequences of assisting a suicide.
Thus, in effect, we simply de-criminalize and detoxify the anti-assisted
suicide stafutes without even debating the merits or demerits of the crime
of assisting a suicide.
A certain recognizable sequence emerges:
(I) it is not unethical to remove all support:
(2) a helprul court or legi slature declares this a new "right":
(3) it becomes unconst itutiona l to interrere with the ex~ rc i se or thi s new
"right":
(4) a move on the rederal treasury or Medicare to in sure that poor peop le ha ve
the same access to thi s new "right" as the rich do:
(5) then we ha ve no more laws against assisting a suicide and physicians who
decline to racilitate such choices will be brand ed "sectarian". "divisive"
and. no doubt . guilty ortrying to "impose their va lues" on poor sick people
who are only trying to exercise their new "rights" .

There are precedents for this sequence in our society.
If the suggestion is correct as to the problem-a changed and new
medical ethic- then the suggested resolution and cure will be found not in
legislation , but in a resolution of ethics .
The medical profession , like all professions in our society, has suffered
the same reductionist pressure , i.e ., reducing the oath and ethic of the
profession simply to the promise not to do anything illegal! Obviously,
that promise has a built-in drain . One promises to change or adjust one's
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ethics with every change or adjustment in law. Compound that with the
triumph of procedural ethics over substantive ethics, and the physicianpatient relationship is turned pretty much inside-out.

Crucial Adherence to Oath
It is particularly the area of euthanasia where adherence to the
professional oath is crucial. A scalpel can either cure or kill; as can drugs.
These substances are blind as to their purpose and results, but the hand
that guides cannot be blind. Historically, one motivational source for
physician's practice came from the profession'S solidarity regarding the
high value of human life, of health and of compassionate therapeutic
intervention. In the euthanasia field , we need not invent the future; we
need only remember the past!
In this century, we have learned in horrifying detail what does happen
when the ethics of medicine changes or collapses or fails to speak up; when
the power to cure gets mixed up with the power to kill.
Just recently, Robert Jay Lifton has published a book entitled The Nazi
Doc/ors: Medical Killing and the Psychology 0/ Genocide. ) I It is not a nice
book to read, nor is it the first entry in the literature of misplaced
sovereignty. Prior to it , Dr. Frederic Wertham published , A Sign For Cain
in 1966, Chapter 6 of which is "The Geranium in the Window: The
Euthanasia M urders.")2
Prior to both of these, Dr. Leo Alexander, a medical consultant at the
Nuremberg Trials, published his famous essay "Medical Science Under
Dictatorship.")) All three of these scholars admit that the euthanasia
movement in Germany did not begin when the first direct order for
euthanasia was signed by Hitler on Sept. I, 1939. Nor did it begin precisely
at 12 noon on Jan. 30, 1933, when President Hindenburg, acting
constitutionally, entrusted the chancellorship of Germany to Adolf Hitler.
No. The euthanasia movement in Germany began and got first
respectability with the publication of a book, published in ~ eipzig in 1920,
entitled Die Freigabe der Vernichtung Lebensunwerten Leben-(The
Release (Permission) olthe Destruction ol Lile Unworthr ol Lile ') This
was published not by Nazis, but by two distinguished German professors:
the jurist. Karl Binding, doctor of jurisprudence and philosophy who
taught for 40 years on the law faculty of the University of Leipzig, and Dr.
Alfred H oche, professor of psychiatry at the University of Freiburg. Prof.
Binding wrote the legal section; Dr. Hoche wrote the medical section. The
book had some popularity because a second edition had to be printed two
years later (1922).
The tiny change that changed everything is right there in the title,
.. Lebensunv.·erten Leben "! ("Life not worth living!") That there is such a
thing as a "life devoid of value"!
Binding and Hoche wrote of "absolutely worthless human beings; those
who have 'neither the will to live nor to die'; those who are 'mentally
completely dead' " 34Notice, with a publication date of 1920, the concept of
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a "life not worth living" was not a Nazi invention, but with the collapse or
withdrawal of the medical , legal and ministerial professions , the Nazis had
no qualms about picking up a well-prepared and field-tested idea that
fitted so well their own maniacal purposes.
For many of our contemporaries, their only view of pre-Hitler
Germany, the Weimar Republic, is a splendid performance by Joel Gray in
the broadway show, Cabaret. The moral decadence and ethical drift were
true and were not limited to nightclub performers. A "Silent
Secularization" preceded National Socialism in the Weimar Germany of
the 1920s and 1930s. It was a secular insistence that man-made ethics is
superior and should take precedence over transcendent values and over the
moral ideals of our common Judeo-Christian heritage. 35 The "smart
money" in the medical field felt a real need to break out of the old and tired
doctrines of the Hippocratic Oath.
The secular drive to first separate, then privatize all transcendent values
and ethics in Weimar greatly facilitated the professional acceptance and
acquiescence of that pivotal pitfall that there is such a thing as a "Iife-notworth-living". Dr. Alexander traces the whole euthanasia movement back
to this single change in mind and attitude; once we change our attitude
toward the non-rehabilitable sick, we are prepared to change everything.
The antidote is simply stated and it is ethical: when there is no cure , we still
provide human care! This does not require ethically optional extraordinary
care, but it does require ordinary care and certainly those minimal means
which are required to sustain, support and preserve any human life .
I consider it a privilege to be a trustee of Calvary Hospital in the Bronx,
an institution committed to patients with advanced cancer. While there is
no cure for advanced cancer, we do provide medical a nd human care at
that hospital. Here , at this Cardinal Cooke Health Care Center, for many,
there is no cure, but medical and human care are provided. It's a simple
rule, but a crucial one, and it is rooted more in ethics than anything else:
where there is no cure, we do provide human care. ,
I do not here pretend to articulate public policy. I do not pretend to
answer any and all legal questions. I do not pretend that there are not or
will not be some very hard cases, but I make no pretense or apology for
what is needed to approach any of those subjects.
The core problem is a matter of trust and that is a matter of ethics,
committed trust to a promised oath and ethic: first, do no harm- no active
harm , no passive harm. That is the core commitment of the medical
profession and must be the first commitment in the actual practice of
medicine .
No profession is immune to ignorance, human weakness, temptation or
greed, and that most definitely includes my own. And that is why the
function of a professional code and ethic is to give the professional his / her
mark , the target for which he / she must aim. To miss chronically or to
permit the miss to become a habit , is to institutionalize se lf-service and
change a dedicated goal into a sophisticated cover-up - yes, even a
February, 1987

39

sophisticated legal cover-up.
I know, as you do, that somO! consider it clever to be cynical, and some
consider it enlightened to be unbelieving, and some consider it sensible to
be prudently silent. But, the cynical, unbelieving, sensible types have been
all too willing to put professional success ahead of true standards and to
put cleverness ahead of real character. That will not serve real patients. It
will not serve the i .ldividual patient however compromised , nor serve the
medical professiolJ however litigated, nor will it serve our society however
much some don't want to look at i'lOr value those of us who don't function
too well or hardly at all.
As Prof. Paul Ramsey often points out, the good that we can do will
only be complemented and completed by the harm we refuse to do. Let the
first principle of medical ethics be the last word: First, do no harm! Next,
do no harm! Last, do no harm to any person of allegedly great value or
allegedly no value. First and last, DO NO HARM!
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